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"IF IT QUACKS LIKE A DUCK:"
COMPARING THE ICJ CHAMBERS TO
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FOR A
MECHANISM OF ENFORCEMENT
JOHN C. GUILDS, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972 and 1978 the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
amended its Rules to stimulate the use of "Chamber" proceedings in
an attempt to breathe new life into the moribund forum. With these
changes, the ICJ Chambers began to closely resemble the workings of
international arbitration. Unfortunately, however, the enforcement of
Chamber awards depends almost exclusively on the willingness of duti-
ful states to comply with the international good deeds and intentions
embodied in the United Nations Convention. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to argue the suitability of adopting a mechanism for enforcing
Chamber awards very similar, if not identical, to those mechanisms
used to enforce awards rendered by the Iran - United States Claims
Tribunal ("Iran - U.S. Tribunal") and the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").
The Iran - U.S. Tribunal and the ICSID will be compared with
the ICJ Chambers because their treaty-based mandates for resolving
disputes involving State actors and addressing questions encompassing
both "public" and "private" concepts of international law mirror the
potential role of the ICJ Chambers. Specifically, three basic concepts
often attributed to international arbitration - the parties' ability to
choose the panel to hear the case, the parties' ability to determine the
applicable law to settle the dispute, and the parties' ability to select the
internal rules to govern the proceeding - will be compared in relation
to the ICJ Chambers, the Iran - U.S. Tribunal and the ICSID.
In the discussion that follows, the history of the ICJ Chambers
will be highlighted for purposes of evaluating its current and potential
functionings in the proper historical perspective. Following this brief
history, the three forums will be compared, leading to the conclusion
that the ICJ Chambers possess many, if not all, of the characteristics
common to international arbitration. Stemming from that conclusion,
an overview of the mechanisms used to enforce the Iran - U.S. Tribu-
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nal and the ICSID will be presented so as to point the way to a feasible
mechanism for enforcing the ICJ Chambers' awards. After addressing
the problem of sovereign immunity and three preliminary matters con-
cerning enforcement of Chamber awards - the appropriate disputes
for Chambers, the necessary limitation of only enforcing monetary
awards, and the benefits of using Chambers - the final conclusion will
be reached that the New York Convention is applicable to enforcing
Chamber awards, but that a new convention should be created to en-
sure the mandatory enforcement of Chamber awards under interna-
tional law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Chambers
The idea of using a limited number of ICJ judges in a Chamber
proceeding, instead of the full membership of the International Court
of Justice, dates back to the Statute of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice ("PCIJ"), the predecessor to the ICJ. 1 The PCIJ Stat-
ute allowed labor, transit and communication disputes to be argued
before a permanent Chamber composed of five judges selected in con-
formity with the requirement of Article 9 of the Statute that "the body
as a whole" be representative "of the main forms of civilization and of
the principal legal systems of the world."' 2 This Chamber procedure,
however, was never utilized.'
1. Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Jus-
tice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 831, 831 (1987) (citing Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, Arts. 26-28, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. I [hereinafter P.C.I.J.
Statute]). Much has been written on the origins of the ICJ Chambers, but only the
highlights are of concern to this paper. For a more thorough examination see Shigeru
Oda, Further Thoughts on the Chamber Procedure of the International Court of Jus-
tice, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 556 (1988); Rudolf Ostrihansky, Chambers of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 37 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 30 (1988); Hermann Mosler, The Ad
Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice - Evaluation After Five Years
of Experience, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY - ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF SH. ROSENNE (1989); Andreas Zimmermann, Ad Hoc Chambers of the
International Court of Justice, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989); Note, A Proposal for the
Second Use of the International Court of Justice Mechanism, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DIsP.
RESOL. 239 (1987).
2. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 831, 832; P.C.I.J. Statute, supra note 1, Art. 9. The
provision remains in the current Statute of the ICJ. Statute of the International Court
of Justice, Art. 9, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 BEVANS 1179 [hereinafter I.C.J.
Statute]. Article 9 of the current statute, however, no longer applies to the creation of
an ad hoc Chamber. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text; infra note 28.
3. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 832. A separate provision of the PCIJ allowed the
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In 1945 the Washington Committee of Jurists, while meeting to
reexamine the Statute of the Court, addressed the idea of creating ad
hoc chambers.' The United States introduced the following proposal, 5
now embodied in Article 26(2) of the ICJ Statute: "The Court may at
any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The num-
ber of judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the
court with the approval of the parties."6
Thus, with this proposal, which was adopted during the San Fran-
cisco Conference creating the United Nations and its judicial branch,
the ICJ, the concept of allowing the parties a voice in forming a Cham-
ber to hear their case was born. Another interesting development aris-
ing from the Washington Committee of Jurists and the San Francisco
Conference was the rejection of Article 9's requirement that the "main
forms of civilization" and "principal legal systems of the world" be rep-
resented in a Chamber formed pursuant to Article 26(2).7 Thus, a
Chamber could now be assembled at the request of the parties without
being confined by Article 9.8 This development freed-up the possible
composition of any given Chamber by increasing the number of "civil"
and "legal" combinations available,9 and thus expanded the list of
judges able to serve.
Nothing occurred in the ICJ in general and the Chambers in par-
ticular until 1971, when a group of concerned nations sought to have
the somnolent condition of the ICJ addressed by the United Nations
creation of a three-member Chamber for Summary Procedure which was utilized in
1924 and 1925 for the Interpretation of the Treaty of Neuilly. Id. (citing Treaty of
Neuilly, Article 179, Annex, Paragraph 4 (Interpretation), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
3 (Judgment of Sept. 12), and Interpretation of Judgment No. 3, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 4 (Judgment of Mar. 26)); James Hyde, A Special Chamber of the International
Court of Justice - An Alternative to Ad Hoc Arbitration, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 439,
440 (1968).
4. Oda, supra note 1, at 560.
5. Id.; Schwebel, supra note 1, at 832.
6. Oda, supra note 1, at 560; Schwebel, supra note 1, at 832; I.C.J. Statute, supra
note 2, Art. 26 (2).
7. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 835; Oda, supra note 1, at 557.
8. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 835; Oda, supra note 1, at 557.
9. For example, a Chamber could now be composed solely of Europeans, or solely
of Latin Americans, or it could be composed of two Asians and three Africans, or of
any number of combinations instead of having to be composed of judges representing
the "five main regions according to United Nations practice." See Oda, supra note 1,
at 557-58; Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 15 (citing Evensen, The International Court
of Justice Main Characteristics and its Contribution to the Development of the Mod-
ern Law of Nations, 57 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 3, 10 (1988)).
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General Assembly." In response, the General Assembly directed the
Secretary-General to solicit the views and suggestions of the States on
the proper role of the ICJ.11 Of the thirty responses received by the
Secretary-General, several specifically mentioned the formation of
Chambers.1 2 The views of the United States called for:
[T]he establishment and wide use of ad hoc chambers of the
Court for legal problems requiring expertise in technical areas,
and for peculiarly regional problems, for whose solution all par-
ties prefer to address a regionally oriented bench....
To encourage use of such chambers, States might write into fu-
ture treaties provisions referring disputes to a special chamber
rather than to the full Court, if appropriate .... Is
In a more detailed statement, the Government of Sweden argued
the following:
No State has ever made use of the possibility of having a dis-
pute adjudicated . . . by a special chamber as provided for in
Article 26 of the Statute. . . . In determining the number of
judges constituting the chamber, the Court shall have the ap-
proval of the parties. On the other hand, the parties are without
any influence when it comes to the election of the individual
judges of such a chamber. The President of the special chamber
as well as its members shall, according to ... the Rules of the
Court, be elected by . . . an absolute majority of votes ....
The Swedish Government believes that the procedure envisaged
in paragraph 2 of Article 26 ... would prove more attractive if
the Rules of the Court were modified to the effect that also the
election of the individual members of a chamber [was] based on
a consensus between the Court and the parties .... In this way,
a special chamber could be constituted either as a regional
10. See Schwebel, supra note 1, at 836; Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 5 (citing
Rosenne, The 1972 Revision of the Rules of the International Court of Justice, 8 ISR.
L. REv. 197, 213 (1973)).
11. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 836.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 836-837 (citing Review of the Role of the International Court of Jus-
tice, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/8382, at 46-47 (1971)).
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chamber or as a chamber composed of judges possessing expert
knowledge of the particular subject to be dealt with. 1'
Showing that these recommendations did not fall on deaf ears, the
ICJ undertook significant rule changes in both 1972 and 1978.15 Arti-
cle 17 of the current Rules of the ICJ outlines the creation of a Cham-
ber and embodies the changes made by the Court:
1. A request for the formation of a Chamber . . . may be filed
at any time until the closure of the written proceedings. Upon
receipt of a request made by one party, the President shall as-
certain whether the other party assents.
2. When the parties have agreed, the President shall ascertain
their views regarding the composition of the Chamber, and
shall report to the Court accordingly ...
3. When the Court has determined, with the approval of the
parties, the number of its Members ... to constitute the Cham-
ber, it shall proceed to their election [by secret ballot] .... 16
Thus, Article 17(2) explicitly states that the President of the
Court is to ascertain the views of the parties "regarding the composi-
tion of the Chamber." In addition, the rule envisions the President of
the Court asking one or possibly two Members of the Court elected to
the Chamber to "give place" to the ad hoc judges chosen by the par-
ties. 7 Because of the fear that selecting some ICJ Judges over others
would alienate the Members of the Court, the constitutionality of Arti-
cle 17(2) was quickly challenged. 8 ICJ Judge Stephen Schwebel sum-
marized the argument against Article 17(2) of the Rules as follows:
14. Id. at 837.
15. Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 5.
16. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 838-39 citing 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 4, at
151-52.
17. SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE 1978 RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 43 (1983); see
Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 16 n.1 10, 19-20. As will be more fully developed below,
the parties to I.C.J. Chamber proceedings can elect, in addition to which Members of
the Court will sit on the Chamber, up to two ad hoc judges in accordance with either
Article 31(2) or Article 31(3) of the I.C.J. Statute. See infra notes 33-36 and accom-
panying text.
18. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 840; see Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in
the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), Constitution of Chamber, 1982 I.C.J. 3, 11-
13 (Order of Jan. 20) (dissenting opinions of Judges Morozov and EI-Khani) [hereinaf-
ter Gulf of Maine Order].
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Article 26 of the Statute provides that the Court may at any
time form a Chamber for dealing with a particular case, and
that the number of judges constituting such a Chamber shall be
determined by the Court with the approval of the parties. Since
the Statute provides for approval by the parties of the number
of the Chamber's judges, it is argued that, inferentially, it ex-
cludes requiring approval by the parties of its composition.
Thus, the provision of the revised Rules requiring the President
of the Court to ascertain the views of the parties regarding the
composition of the Chamber, it is claimed, is inconsistent with
the Statute, which, of course, governs the Rules.19
Thus, the crux of the resistance to transforming the ICJ into a
more viable forum by facilitating the needs and desires of the parties in
forming a Chamber was that granting such considerations threatened
to usurp the domain of the Court. Although this idea was seemingly
guilty of denying the scant scope of the Court's docket for a fatuous
allegiance to its jurisdiction, the idea was vigorously believed." ° But in
1974 the U.N. General Assembly gave a strong vote of confidence for
the changes in the ICJ Rules by declaring:
The General Assembly, ...
Considering that the International Court of Justice has recently
amended the Rules of Court with a view to facilitating recourse
to it for the judicial settlement of disputes, . . . and allowing for
greater influence of parties on the composition of ad hoc cham-
bers, . . .
Draws the attention of States to the possibility of making use of
chambers as provided in Articles 26 and 29 ... including those
which would deal with particular categories of cases.2
1
19. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 839-40; see Oda, supra note 1, at 556; see also
Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 17 (citing G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAW 393
(1986) (Arguing that if Article 17(2) of the Rules does not conform with the Statute,
then Article 17(2) and any actions under it are ultra vires and therefore null and
void.)); see generally ROSENNE, supra note 17, at 43-45 (Discussing various issues con-
cerning the role of the parties in composing a Chamber and the possible conflict with
the Statute).
20. See Oda, supra note 1, at 558-59; Schwebel, supra note 1, at 842; ROSENNE,
supra note 17, at 44-45.
21. G.A. Res. 3232, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31 at 141-42, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) cited in Schwebel, supra note 1, at 842-843 and Zimmermann, supra note 1, at
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This declaration supporting the use of ad hoc Chambers, plus the
actual forming of four ad hoc Chambers since 1982, confirms the
emergence of a new way of doing business in the ICJ.12 A former
Member and President of the ICJ succinctly outlined this "new way of
doing business" under the Rules, while explaining the reality of the
situation, when he wrote in 1973:
After the President reports on [the consultations with the par-
ties concerning the composition of the Chamber], the Court
must always proceed to an election of the members of the
Chamber by secret ballot, thus retaining ultimate control over
the composition of any Chamber. However, . . . it is difficult to
conceive that in normal circumstances those Members who
have been suggested by the parties would not be elected . . .
since it would simply result in compelling the parties to resort
to an outside arbitral tribunal .... 2
The validity of this view is attested to by the formation of the ad hoc
Chamber created to settle the maritime boundary dispute between the
22. See Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 18. The four Chamber decisions are: Gulf
of Maine Order, supra note 18, at 3; Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Constitu-
tion of Chamber, 1985 I.C.J. 6 (Order of Apr. 3) [hereinafter Frontier Dispute Order];
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Constitution of Chamber, 1987 I.C.J.
3 (Order of Mar. 2) [hereinafter ELSI Order]; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), Constitution of Chamber, 1987 I.C.J. 10 (Order of May 8)
[hereinafter Land, Island and Maritime Order].
23. Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure
of the International Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1973); see also
Schwebel, supra note 1, at 853 ("Thus, responsibility for the activation - and hence,
at bottom, the composition as well as the size - of an ad hoc Chamber is shared
between the Court and the parties."); Land, Island and Maritime Order, supra note
22, at 13 (declaration of Judge Oda)("In practical terms . . . it is inevitable, if a
Chamber is to be viable, that its composition must result from a consensus between the
parties and the Court.").
The Jimenez de Arechaga article proved to be instrumental in the United States'
decision to use the ICJ Chambers in the Gulf of Maine case. "The United States was
first attracted to the Chamber procedure for the reasons set out by Eduardo Jimenez de
Arechaga in a 1973 article in the American Journal of International Law on the 1972
amendments to the Rules of Court." Davis R. Robinson, David A. Colson & Bruce C.
Rashkow, Some Perspectives on Adjudicating Before The World Court: The Gulf of
Maine Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 578, 581 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson, Colson]. "Da-
vis R. Robinson . . . served as the United States Agent in the Gulf of Maine case.
David A. Colson . .. served as the United States Deputy Agent in the case. Bruce C.
Rashkow... served as Director of the Office of Canadian Maritime Boundary Adjudi-
cation, Office of the Legal Advisor, during the case." Id. at 578.
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United States and Canada over the Gulf of Maine.
B. Forming The First Chamber
The Gulf of Maine case, the first ever to utilize a specialized
Chamber,2 4 was initially brought before the ICJ pursuant to Article 40
of the ICJ Statute 5 by the United States and Canada jointly submit-
ting a special agreement requesting a five-member Chamber to be es-
tablished under Article 26(2).26 After consulting with the United
States and Canada on the make-up of the Chamber pursuant to Rule
17(2), the Court elected by a vote of 1 1 to 2 the five judges that the
parties had requested.2 7
The five Members of the Court elected to the Chamber were
Judges Gros (France), Ruda (Argentina), Mosler (Federal Republic of
Germany), Ago (Italy), and Schwebel (United States).28 In addition,
because the Court had an American but not a Canadian Member on
the bench, Canada was eligible pursuant to Article 31(2) of the Statute
to choose an ad hoc judge to sit on the Chamber.2 9 Thus, acting upon
the request of the President under Article 31(4) of the Statute, Judge
24. Stephen M. Schwebel, New Life For World Court, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 375,
377 (1983).
25. Article 40, paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statute states that: "Cases are brought
before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special agree-
ment or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject
of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated." I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 40
(1) (emphasis added).
26. Robinson, Colson, supra note 23, at 580.
27. Gulf of Maine Order, supra note 18, at 8-9; see Schwebel, supra note 1, at
845; see generally Robinson, Colson, supra note 23, at 582-583 (Recounting how the
Gulf of Maine Chamber was created.); Robert H. Brauer, Note, International Conflict
Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and the Gulf of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 463
(1983) [hereinafter Brauer].
28. Gulf of Maine Order, supra note 18, at 9; Robinson, Colson, supra note 23, at
582. It should be noted that the composition of the Chamber was clearly Western, and
thus in no way complied with the once required mandate of Article 9 of the Statute
that the "main forms of civilization" and "principal legal systems" be represented.
That only one Member of the Court, Judge EI-Khani, dissented in the Constitution of
Chamber Order on these grounds demonstrates that a majority of the Court realizes
that Article 9 no longer applies to the formation of a Chamber. Gulf of Maine Order,
supra note 18, at 12; see Schwebel, supra note 1, at 851.
29. Gulf of Maine Order, supra note 18, at 4. Article 31(2) allows a party to
"choose a person to sit as judge" when "the court includes upon the Bench a judge of
the nationality of [the other party]." Article 31(3) allows each party "to choose a
judge" when "the court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of [either
party]." See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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Ruda willingly "gave place," i.e., gave up his seat on the Chamber, to
Maxwell Cohen of Canada to serve as the ad hoc judge.-0
Hence, in forming and, more importantly, in composing the Gulf
of Maine Chamber, the ICJ strictly abided by the requests of the
United States and Canada, thus indicating that by using a properly
worded special agreement,31 nations are well assured of obtaining a
Chamber composed of the Members of the Court and ad hoc judges
they desire.
Having outlined the history and procedure of creating a Chamber,
the ICJ Chambers can now be compared to the Iran - U.S. Tribunal
and the ICSID for the purpose of developing a mechanism for enforc-
ing its awards.
III. COMPARING THE FORUMS
A. The Ability To Choose The Panel
1. ICJ Chamber
The first of the basic concepts to be compared - the parties' abil-
ity to choose the panel to hear the case - finds that parties wishing to
form an ICJ Chamber, because of the cognizant reality that they can
abandon an unsuitable Chamber altogether for another forum, can
freely choose from the existing Members of the Court.32 Their freedom
to choose ad hoc judges, i.e., persons from outside the Members of the
Court, is limited, however, by Articles 31(2), 31(3), and to a lesser
30. Gulf of Maine Order, supra note 18, at 10; see Robinson, Colson, supra note
23, at 582. However, in two of the subsequent Chamber proceedings, the Frontier Dis-
pute Case and the Land, Island and Maritime Boundary Case, the Court directly
elected only three Members of the Court to serve on the Chambers, leaving vacant two
ad hoc positions to be filled by the parties and avoiding the step of having to ask two
Members of the Court to "give place." Zimmermann, supra note 1, at 19-20; Frontier
Dispute Order, supra note 22, at 7; Land, Island and Maritime Order, supra note 22,
at 12.
31. For example, the treaty and special agreement between the United States and
Canada provided an "escape clause" allowing for the dispute to be "submit[ted] to a
Court of Arbitration" "[i]f, for any reason, the Chamber ... [was not] constituted in
accordance with the provisions of [the] Treaty and the Special Agreement." Treaty
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Can-
ada to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Bound-
ary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Art. II, 20 I.L.M. 1377 (1981) [hereinafter Gulf of
Maine Treaty]. The special agreement between El Salvador and Honduras in the Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute contained a similar clause. Zimmermann, supra
note 1, at 17 n.113.
32. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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degree, Article 31(6). Article 31(2) provides that "[i]f the Court in-
cludes . . . a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other
party may choose a person [from outside the Court] to sit as judge." 3
Therefore, in the Gulf of Maine case, Canada was able to select an ad
hoc Member to the Chamber because the full Court of the ICJ in-
cluded a national of the United States but not of Canada.3 4 Conversely,
the United States was not able to select an ad hoc judge to the Cham-
ber because it already had a national on the Court. 5
33. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 31(2).
34. Gulf of Maine Order, supra note 18, at 9.
35. Article 31(2) raises two questions. The first question is if both parties to a
dispute have a national on the Court, may both parties choose an ad hoc judge? In the
ELSI case both parties (the United States and Italy) had a national on the Court, but
neither party was able to choose an ad hoc judge. ELSI Order, supra note 22, at 4.
Thus, the logical reading of Article 31(2) is that where the Court includes a judge of
the nationality of one of the parties but not the other, then the other party may choose
an ad hoc judge. Article 31 is therefore meant to assure that no one party is given an
unfair advantage over the other by having a national on the Court that is not balanced
by a national of the other party also being on the Court. But should both parties be
equally represented by a national on the Court, the matter is settled and the composi-
tion of the Chamber is limited to choosing from among the permanent Members of the
ICJ.
The second question raised by Article 31(2) is what if a party, the United States,
for example, had a national on the Court but did not want him or her to serve on the
Chamber - would the United States then be able to choose an ad hoc judge? The
answer apparently is no. Following the reasoning above, the ability to choose an ad hoc
judge is limited to parties that do not have a national serving on the Court.
Strong evidence supporting this proposition is found in an amendment made to the
Gulf of Maine Special Agreement between the United States and Canada. The Letter
of Submittal from the Department of State to the President of the United States sum-
marized Article I of the Special Agreement as prescribing a Chamber "composed of
three judges elected by and from the members of the Court and two judges ad hoc,
who shall not be nationals of the United States or Canada." Letter of Submittal, 20
I.L.M. 1374, 1374 (1981). But as stated above, only Canada was able to appoint an ad
hoc judge to the Chamber.
That this would occur, however, was foreseen by the United States Senate amend-
ing Article I of the Special Agreement to read: "The parties shall submit the question
posed ... to a Chamber . . . , composed of five persons, to be constituted after consulta-
tion with the Parties, pursuant to Article 26(2) and Article 31 of the Statute ......
Text of Resolution of Ratification, 20 I.L.M. 1389, 1389 (1981). The amendment was
explained as being needed "to take into consideration changed circumstances of the
I.C.J." S. REP. No. 5, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1383, 1385
(1981). These events appear to emphasize that while the ICJ is willing to abide by the
wishes of the parties as to which of its Members shall serve on a Chamber, it will
strongly enforce the requirement that only parties without nationals serving on the
Court can appoint ad hoc judges.
Thus, in the event that the United States did not want Judge Schwebel to serve on
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Article 31(3) applies when neither party forming the Chamber has
a national on the Court. In this situation, the parties enjoy the most
leeway. Not only are they able to select, as occurred in the Frontier
Dispute case and the Land, Island and Maritime case, three Members
of the Court to serve on the Chamber, but they are also able to select
one ad hoc judge each.36 As will be more fully developed below, the
ability to form a Chamber in conjunction with Article 31(3) is a lead-
ing benefit of using an ICJ Chamber to settle an inter-State dispute. 7
The ability to appoint ad hoc judges is limited by a final consider-
ation - Article 31(6)..3 Article 31(6)'s most basic requirement is that
those selected to serve as ad hoc judges be persons "of high moral char-
acter, who possess[] the qualifications required in [their] respective
countr[ies] for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris-
consults of recognized competence in international law."3 9 But, consid-
ering the abundance of highly qualified persons willing and able to
serve as ad hoc judges, the requirement of Article 31(6) is a minimal
restriction that rightfully serves to assure the integrity of the Chamber.
Thus, as established in Article 26(2) and Article 31 of the ICJ Statute,
nations agreeing to appear before an ICJ Chamber command substan-
tial latitude in choosing the judges to hear their case.
2. Iran - U.S. Tribunal
Parties before an ICJ Chamber enjoy much more freedom in
choosing the panel to hear their case than do parties appearing before
the Iran - U.S. Tribunal."' In fact, parties before the Iran - U.S. Tribu-
a specialized Chamber, the Chamber could conceivably be formed pursuant to Rule
17(2) without Judge Schwebel being elected to serve on it, but the United States would
remain unable to select an ad hoc judge. Nothing in Article 3 1(1), which states that
"Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their right to sit in the case
before the Court," would dictate an opposite result. For Article 31(1) to do more than
allow Judges to hear cases in which their home nations are parties by granting them an
affirmative right to hear such cases would be grossly inconsistent with the intent and
purpose of Rule 17(2).
36. Frontier Dispute Order, supra note 22, at 7; Land, Island and Maritime Or-
der, supra note 22, at 12.
37. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
38. Article 31(6) reads in full: "Judges chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3,
and 4 of this Article shall fulfill the conditions required by Articles 2, 17 (paragraph
2), 20, and 24 of the present Statute. They shall take part in the decision on terms of
complete equality with their colleagues." I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 36(6).
39. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 2.
40. The Iran - United States Claims Tribunal is an outgrowth of the political and
military crisis the United States and Iran underwent in 1979 and 1980. The Iran -
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nal are powerless in choosing the panel to hear their case. Article III of
the Claims Settlement Declaration governs the formation of the Iran -
U.S. Tribunal and its subsequent panels. It reads in relevant part:
1. The Tribunal shall consist of nine members . . . . [Ejach
government shall appoint one-third of the members .... [T]he
members so appointed shall by mutual agreement select the re-
maining third of the members and appoint one of the remaining
third President of the Tribunal. Claims may be decided by the
full Tribunal or by a panel of three members of the Tribunal as
the President shall determine. Each such panel shall be com-
United States Claims Tribunal was created pursuant to what is collectively known as
the Algiers Accords. The Algiers Accords consists of: The Declaration of the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (Jan. 19, 1981) [hereinafter General Declara-
tion]; the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jan. 19, 1981) [hereinafter Claims Set-
tlement Declaration]; the Undertakings of the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
(Jan. 19, 1981) [hereinafter Undertakings]; and the Escrow Agreement with related
technical agreements set up to fund awards of the Iran - United States Claims Tribu-
nal against Iran, reprinted in Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter [hereinafter I.A.L.R.]
2,361-74 (Feb. 6, 1981).
Article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration establishes three areas of jurisdic-
tion for the Iran - United States Claims Tribunal:
1. An International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran - United States Claims Tribu-
nal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of
the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the
United States ....
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims of the United
States and Iran against each other arising out of contractual arrangements
between them for the purchase and sale of goods and services.
3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction ... over any dispute as to the interpre-
tation or performance of any provision of [the General Declaration].
I.A.L.R. 2,364 (Feb. 6, 1981).
A multitude of articles have been written on numerous issues concerning the Iran -
U.S. Tribunal, many beyond the narrow scope of this article. They include: E. Lauter-
pacht, The Iran - United States Claims Tribunal - An Assessment, 1982 PRIVATE
INVESTORS ABROAD 213; James H. Carter, The Iran - United States Claims Tribunal:
Observations on the First Year, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1076 (1982); Lake & Dana, Judi-
cial Review of Awards of the Iran - United States Claims Tribunal: Are the Tribu-
nal's Awards Dutch?, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 755 (1984); David Caron, The
Nature of the Iran - United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of
International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1990); Robert P. Lewis,
What Goes Around Comes Around; Can Iran Enforce Awards of the Iran - U.S.
Claims Tribunal in the United States?, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515 (1988).
1992] COMPARING THE ICJ CHAMBERS
posed by the President ....
2. Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the Tribu-
nal shall conduct its business in accordance with the arbitration
rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified by the par-
ties or by the Tribunal .... 41
Thus, Article I11(1) provides for the full Tribunal consisting of
nine members - six having been appointed by the two governments -
which can be divided by the President into three panels consisting of
three members each. As foreseen by Article 111(2), which provides the
rules of the Tribunal, the UNCITRAL Rules needed slight modifica-
tion to be efficiently used by the Iran - U.S. Tribunal."2 These modifi-
cations, however, did not change the UNCITRAL rules governing the
appointment of arbitrators. But an important note of clarification was
added to the text of the rules finally adopted: "As used in Articles 6, 7
and 8 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and "parties" refer
to the one or both of the two Governments, as the case may be."4
41. I.A.L.R. 2,364 (Feb. 6, 1981).
42. Stewart Abercrombie Baker & Mark David Davis, Establishment of an Arbi-
tral Tribunal Under the UNCITRAL Rules: The Experience of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 23 INT'L LAW. 81, 83 (1989).
43. I.A.L.R. 6,313 (Apr. 1, 1983). The final rules can be found at I.A.L.R. 6,306
(Apr. 1, 1983). The UNCITRAL, and hence, the Iran - U.S. Tribunal rules governing
the appointment of members of an arbitral tribunal are Articles 6 through 8. Article 6,
which concerns the appointment of a sole arbitrator to a panel of one, is not relevant to
the Iran - U.S. Tribunal because of Article III(l)'s instruction that the panels will
consist of three members each. I.A.L.R. 6,312-13 (Apr. 1, 1983). Article 7 of the
UNCITRAL Rules, however, concerns the appointment of arbitrators to a panel of
three and is therefore relevant to the Iran - U.S. Tribunal. Article 7 provides that:
1. If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbi-
trator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator
who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the tribunal.
2. If within thirty days ... of the appointment of an arbitrator the other party
has not notified the first party of the arbitrator he has appointed:
(a) The first party may request the appointing authority previously
designated by the authorities to appoint the second arbitrator; or
(b) If no such authority has been .. .designated . . . or if the ap-
pointing authority ... refuses ... or fails to appoint the arbitrator
within thirty days .... the first party may request ... the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration ... to designate the appointing authority.
The first party may then request the appointing authority to appoint
the second arbitrator.
3. If within thirty days after the appointment of the second arbitrator the two
arbitrators have not agreed on ... the presiding arbitrator, the presiding arbi-
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Thus, the Rules of the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, along with Article 11(1)
of the Claims Settlement Declaration, clearly demonstrate that only
the Governments of the United States and Iran, and not the individual
parties, are allowed any input in determining the composition of a
panel.
Nor do the individual parties have any input as to which of the
three panels forming the Iran - U.S. Tribunal is to hear their case. In
adopting the new rules of the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, the UNCITRAL
Rule, Article 5, addressing the number of members on a panel, was
replaced by the following:
The composition of the Chambers, the assignment of cases to
various Chambers, the transfer of cases among Chambers and
the relinquishment by Chambers of certain cases to the Full
Tribunal will be provided for in orders issued by the President,
pursuant to his powers under Article III, paragraph 1 of the
Claims Settlement Declaration."
Thus, concerning the parties' ability to choose the panel to hear
the case, parties before the Iran - U.S. Tribunal are powerless in deter-
mining the composition of the panel and must present their case to
whichever panel they are assigned by the President. This, however, is
not the case for parties before an ICSID 4 5 arbitration - who enjoy
trator shall be appointed by an appointing authority ....
I.A.L.R. 6,313 (Apr. 1, 1983). Article 8 concerns the documents and biographical in-
formation that would have to be furnished when requesting to appoint an arbitrator.
I.A.L.R. 6,313 (Apr. 1, 1983).
44. I.A.L.R. 6,312 (Apr. 1, 1983).
45. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID") was established by Article 1(1) of the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States [hereinafter
I.C.S.I.D. Convention], done at Washington, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966), reprinted in 4 I.L.M.
532 (1965) and in I.C.S.I.D. Basic Documents 11 (1985). ICSID has its headquarters
at the World Bank Offices in Washington, D.C. and is sponsored by the Bank. Article
1(2) of the ICSID Convention states that: "The purpose of the Centre shall be to
provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Con-
tracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Convention."
As with the ICJ Chambers and the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, there exists a plethora of
books and articles written on an abundance of ICSID topics. These materials include:
George R. Delaume, The Finality of Arbitration Involving States: Recent Develop-
ments, 5 ARB. INT'L 21 (1989); George R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the
Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1983); George R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration in
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almost unlimited freedom in choosing the panel to hear their case.
3. ICSID
In an ICSID arbitration, the parties' ability to choose ad hoc arbi-
trators is found in Articles 37 through 40 of the ICSID Convention,
which provide for the "Constitution of the Tribunal."4 Article
37(2)(a) states one of the few procedural rules that are mandatory for
ICSID arbitration:47 "The Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or
any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree."
Thus, a requirement for an ICSID arbitration is that the panel (or Tri-
bunal, as used in the ICSID Convention) consist of an uneven number
of arbitrators. Other than that, the panel is chosen "as the parties shall
agree."
One of the main functions of ICSID is to maintain a list of possi-
ble arbitrators from which the parties may choose when composing a
panel to hear their dispute.4 8 But just as parties choosing ad hoc judges
for an ICJ Chamber are not confined to the Members of the Court,
parties forming an ICSID panel are not confined to the list in selecting
their arbitrators. Article 40(1) of the ICSID Convention allows the
parties to appoint arbitrators from outside the list, subject only to the
requirements of Article 40(2) 41 - that the arbitrators be of high moral
character, recognized competence in the field of law, and able to be
relied upon to exercise independent judgement."' Other than this re-
striction of competence and fair dealing, the parties to an ICSID arbi-
tration have an absolute ability to choose the panel for resolving their
dispute.
Hence, a comparison of the three forums illustrates that the par-
Practice, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 58 (1984); Comment, United States Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States: Implications of the ICSID Convention 17
HARV. INT'L L. J. 401 (1976); Soley, ICSID Implementation: An Effective Alternative
to International Conflict, 19 INT'L LAW. 521 (1985).
46. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 45, Chapter IV, Section 2 (containing Arti-
cles 37-40).
47. Richard T. Graving, The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions:
How Good A Job Are They Doing?, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 319, 363 (1989).
48. "Panel of Arbitrators" is the nomenclature used by the Convention. I.C.S.I.D.
Convention, supra note 45, Chapter I, Section 4 (consisting of Articles 12-16).
49. Article 40 provides in full:
(1) Arbitrators may be appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators, ex-
cept in the case of appointments by the Chairman pursuant to Article 38.
(2) Arbitrators appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators shall possess
the qualities stated in paragraph (1) of Article 14.
50. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 45, Art. 14 (1).
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ties' ability to choose the panel to hear the case covers the full spec-
trum - from parties before the ICSID having almost total discretion
in selecting their arbitrators, to parties before the Iran - U.S. Tribunal
having no choice at all. Falling near the ICSID on the spectrum are
parties before an ICJ Chamber, having the ability to choose both ex-
isting Members of the Court and ad hoc judges to make-up the panel
to hear their dispute.
B. The Ability To Determine The Law
1. ICJ Chambers
Turning to the second area for comparison, parties before an ICJ
Chamber entertain great authority in determining the law for settling
their dispute. Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute mandates the applica-
tion of international law by a Chamber when adjudicating a case. The
Article, however, leaves open an important window for the use of party
determined law. Article 38(1) provides that:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determi-
nation of rules of law. 1
Thus, Article 38(l)(a) directs ICJ Chambers to apply "rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states" in settling a dispute. 52 And
51. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 38(l)(emphasis added). Scholars generally
agree that Article 38(1) "is the most authoritative statement of the sources of interna-
tional law." Grant H. Hanessian, "General Principles of Law" in the Iran - U.S.
Claims Tribunal, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 309, 324 n.71, citing L. HENKIN, R.
PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 36
(2d ed. 1987).
52. A leading authority on the ICJ, Shabtai Rosenne, has said that Articles
COMPARING THE ICJ CHAMBERS
although the Article only mentions international conventions as estab-
lishing the recognized rules, the ELSI case between the United States
and Italy demonstrates that treaties can also establish "rules expressly
recognized" by the parties to be applied in deciding disputes submitted
to an ICJ Chamber.5
In the ELSI case 4 the United States, pursuant to Article 40 of the
ICJ Statute, filed a written application with the ICJ requesting the for-
mation of a Chamber for proceedings against the Government of It-
aly.5 5 The gravamen of the United States complaint was that the requi-
sition by Italian authorities of an United States company's Italian
subsidiary (ELSI) prevented the subsidiary's orderly liquidation and
forced it into bankruptcy, all of which allegedly violated the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN") between the two na-
tions 6 The Italians responded by denying that they had violated the
FCN Treaty, but that, even if they had, no payment of damages was
justified because ELSI was already bankrupt when seized by the Ital-
ian officials. 7
The importance of the case is not that the Chamber held for Italy,
but that it strictly applied the facts of the dispute solely to the rules
recognized by the two governments in the FCN Treaty. As stated in
Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion, the United States lost the case not
because the Chamber "found against the United States on the law of
the treaty," which was "largely interpreted to give [it] effect rather
38(l)(a) and 38(l)(b) "merely refer to the generally accepted elements of the conven-
tional and customary general international law, and call for no special comment."
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 607 (2d
ed. 1985). He noted, however, that the requirement of the rules being "recognized" by
the states was normally satisfied by both states being signatories to the convention. Id.
at 607 n.4.
53. The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)
determines that the terms "treaty" and "convention" have the same meaning. Restate-
ment Section 301 states: "The terminology used for international agreements is varied.
Among the terms used are treaty, convention . . . . Whatever their designation, all
agreements have the same legal status, except as their provisions or the circumstances
of their conclusion indicate otherwise." B. CARTER & P. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 80 (1991).
54. ELSI Order, supra note 22, at 3; Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v.
Italy), Decision on the Merits, 1989 I.C.J. 15 (Order of July 20) [hereinafter ELSI
Decision]. For a good analysis of the decision, see Gill, International Court of Justice
- Diplomatic Protection - U.S. Italian Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 249 (1990).
55. Gill, supra note 54, at 249.
56. Id. at 249-250.
57. Id.
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than to deprive [it] of effect," but because the Chamber found against
"the practical and legal significance to be attached to the facts of the
case." 58 Thus, the ELSI case serves to demonstrate that, pursuant to
Article 38(1)(a) of the ICJ Statute, parties appearing before an ICJ
Chamber possess the ability to determine the applicable law used to
settle their dispute. This ability comes in the form of carefully drafted
treaties, conventions, and even special agreements to bring cases before
ICJ Chambers.59
2. Iran - U.S. Tribunal
In contrast to parties appearing before an ICJ Chamber, parties
appearing before the Iran - U.S. Tribunal do not have the ability to
determine the applicable law to be employed in settling their dispute.
Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration defines the applicable
law to be employed by the Iran - U.S. Tribunal:
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for
law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of com-
mercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be
applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade,
contract provisions and changed circumstances.6 0
Here, the key point is that the Tribunal, not the parties, deter-
mines the law applicable to the particular case to be heard. As stated
58. Id. at 256 citing 1989 I.C.J. at 95 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
59. The Special Agreement between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of
Maine case illustrates this proposition. Article 11(1) of the Special Agreement stated:
"The Chamber is requested to decide [the dispute], in accordance with the principles
and rules of international law applicable in the matter as between the Parties." Gulf of
Maine Special Agreement, 20 I.L.M. 1378 (1981). Of more interest, however, is the
Letter of Submittal from the Department of State to the President of the United
States, which summarized Article IV of the Special Agreement as follows:
Article IV of the Special Agreement requests the Chamber to utilize, and
obligates the Parties to utilize, certain technical provisions. These provisions
enumerated in Article IV are for the purpose of ensuring to the fullest extent
possible that there will be no misunderstanding or technical misapplication of
the maritime boundary established by the Chamber.
Letter of Submittal, 20 I.L.M. 1374, 1375 (1981). Thus, the Gulf of Maine Special
Agreement functioned not only to create the Chamber to hear the dispute, but also to
provide highly technical "rules expressly recognized" by the parties and concluded by
the Chamber to decide the dispute.
60. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 40, Art. V (emphasis added); see
generally Hanessian, supra note 51 (Discussing the use of "general principles of law"
under Article V of the Iran - U.S. Claims Tribunal.).
1992] COMPARING THE ICJ CHAMBERS
above, Article 111(2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration foresaw the
possible need to modify the UNCITRAL Rules for use in the Iran -
U.S. Tribunal.61 That the UNCITRAL Rule titled "Applicable Law"
was completely replaced by Article V of the Claims Settlement Decla-
ration is particularly revealing of the powerlessness of parties appearing
before the Iran - U.S. Tribunal in determining the applicable law to
settle their dispute.62
It must be noted, however, that Article II of the Claims Settle-
ment Declaration grants the Iran - U.S. Tribunal jurisdiction over
three areas: claims of nationals of the United States or Iran against the
other government; claims between the two governments over contrac-
tual arrangements for the purchase and sale of goods and services; and
disputes between the two governments over the interpretation or per-
formance of the General Declaration.63 The first of these areas, the
claims of nationals, involves parties who are powerless in determining
the applicable law to settle their dispute.64 But the situation in the sec-
61. See supra notes 41 and 42 and accompanying text.
62. The modified rule reads in full:
1. The arbitral tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law,
applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and interna-
tional law as the arbitral tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into
account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
circumstances.
2. The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono only if the arbitrating
parties have expressly and in writing authorized it to do so.
I.A.L.R. 6,325 (Apr. 1, 1983).
Some commentators believe the ability of the tribunal to hear cases ex aequo et
bono is contrary to Article V. See David P. Stewart & Laura B. Sherman, Develop-
ments at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1983).
By way of comparison, in the original UNCITRAL Rule, Article 33 stated:
1. The arbitral tribunal shall apply the law designated by the parties as appli-
cable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties,
the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws
rules which it considers applicable.
2. The arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et
bono only if the parties have expressly authorized the arbitral tribunal to do
so and if the law applicable to the arbitral procedure permits such arbitration.
3. In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms
of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable
to the transaction.
I.A.L.R. 6,324-25 (Apr. 1, 1983).
63. See supra note 40.
64. One commentator has written:
The Tribunal is obviously different from the typical commercial arbitration
proceeding in that the parties before the Tribunal did not choose to have their
disputes settled according to the choice of law rules set forth in Article V of
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ond and third areas of jurisdiction is somewhat different.
Areas two and three involve disputes, because they are between
states, very similar, if not identical, to the disputes brought before ICJ
Chambers. A characteristic shared in common by the United States
and Iran in negotiating the Algiers Accords to be enforced by the Iran
- U.S. Tribunal and of other nations in negotiating an international
agreement to be enforced by an ICJ Chamber is that once a dispute
arises and is brought before either forum, interpretation of the docu-
ment is solely dependent on the collective wisdom of the members of
the body. Thus, although the United States and Iran, like any other
nations creating a binding international agreement, had the opportunity
to state within the Algiers Accords the applicable law for settling sub-
sequent disputes, that opportunity no longer exists and now belongs
uniquely to the Tribunal through the mandate of Article V of the
Claims Settlement Declaration. On the other hand, nations bringing a
case before an ICJ Chamber under Article 40 of the Statute may care-
fully negotiate and articulate in their special agreement the "recog-
nized rules" to be applied to the dispute pursuant to Article 38(1)(a).
Therefore, an advantage enjoyed by nations before an ICJ Chamber is
the opportunity of negotiating and drafting the appropriate "recognized
rules" for settling the dispute after it has arisen, and thus being able to
pinpoint the manner in which the issue will be resolved.
3. ICSID
Parties appearing in ICSID arbitrations enjoy almost total liberty
in determining the applicable law for settling their dispute. Article
42(1) of the ICSID Convention states:
(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of
such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Con-
tracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the
conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be
applicable.6 5
Thus, the presumption of an ICSID arbitration is that the dispute shall
the Claims Settlement Agreement .... [T]he Tribunal has applied "general
principles of law" even where the parties have chosen a national law to govern
their contract.
Hanessian, supra note 51, at 347-48.
65. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 45, Art. 42.
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be decided by the rules of law determined by the parties. Only if the
parties are unable to agree on what law governs the dispute is the
ICSID panel of arbitrators then able to intervene. In addition, any in-
tervention on the part of the arbitrators to determine the applicable law
for deciding the dispute must follow the tight instructions of Article
42(1), thus providing the parties with further assurances as to what law
will be applied.
In the absence of the parties agreeing on the applicable law, Arti-
cle 42(1) instructs the ICSID arbitrators first to apply the law of the
Contracting State involved in the dispute, and subsequently "such rules
of international law as may be applicable." This systematic, two-stage
procedure creates a balanced application of law equally favorable to
both parties. First, the law of the Contracting State is applied to the
dispute, thus protecting the State's pride and national sovereignty and
soothing any sensitivity to undue influence from outside sources. But
the result reached under national law is then checked for inconsisten-
cies with the rule of international law, thus protecting the investor from
unfair treatment by the host State. The idea was well summarized by a
former General Counsel to the World Bank and architect of the ICSID
Convention:
My submission as to the relationship between the law of the
host State and international law in the second sentence of 42(1)
is as follows. The Tribunal will first look to the law of the host
State and that law will in the first instance be applied to the
merits of the dispute. Then the result will be tested against in-
ternational law. That process will not involve the confirmation
or denial of the validity of the host State's law, but may result
in not applying it where that law, or action taken under that
law, violates international law. In that sense, . . . international
law is hierarchically superior to national law under Article
42(1).6-
Thus, in the absence of an agreement between the parties on the
applicable law, an ICSID panel of arbitrators, like an ICJ Chamber or
the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, will, in the final analysis, apply rules of inter-
national law in deciding the dispute. However, the major difference be-
tween the three forums is that parties before an ICJ Chamber or an
ICSID panel are able to influence the law applicable to deciding their
66. Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States, 136 R.C.A.D.I. 331, 392 (1972-11)
quoted in Graving, supra note 47, at 362-63.
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dispute, whereas parties before the Iran - U.S. Tribunal are confined to
the mandate of Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
C. The Ability To Select the Rules
1. ICJ Chambers
The final comparison to be made among the three forums is the
parties' ability to select the internal rules to govern the proceeding. Ar-
ticle 101 of the ICJ Rules recognizes the parties' ability to modify the
normal Rules of Court. It provides:
The parties to a case may jointly propose particular modifica-
tions or additions to the rules contained in the present Part
(with the exception of Articles 93 to 97 inclusive), which may
be applied by the Court or a Chamber if the Court or the
Chamber considers them appropriate in the circumstances of
the case.
6 7
Thus, the parties appearing before the ICJ, either the full Court or
a Chamber, have the explicit, if not inherent, ability to modify the ICJ
Rules to their liking. The inherent nature of this ability has been ex-
plained as such:
The litigants are sovereign states (Statute, Article 34), and the
Court is their organ. The ability of the Court to impose its will
upon the parties is thus much more limited than in any domes-
tic litigation. Forceful expression of this appears in Article 101
of the Rules.
Procedure in the Court is regulated by a curious, and not en-
tirely logical, combination of provisions appearing sometimes in
the Statute and sometimes in the Rules of Court . . . .Rules
appearing in the Statute are thus mandatory, while the others
possess an inherent flexibility, preserved by Article 101 of the
Rules. Among the statutory provisions of particular relevance
• . .is the categoric requirement in Article 43, paragraph 1, of
the Statute that the procedure shall consist of two parts: writ-
67. International Court of Justice Rules of Court, Art. 101 [hereinafter I.C.J.
Rules] reprinted in ROSENNE, supra note 17, at 208. Articles 93-97 concern the issu-
ance of judgments by the Court or a Chamber. Id. at 192-200.
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ten and oral .... 11
Therefore, proceedings before an ICJ Chamber are restricted by
the statutory requirements of Article 43(1), which is largely a codifica-
tion of the rules of inter-State arbitration developed prior to World
War I and subsequently formulated to govern the Permanent Court of
International Justice.69 One of the basic principles carried over from
these origins and now reflected in the procedure of the Court is the
principle of the equality of the parties."0 This principle, as it relates to
written and oral proceedings, is quantitatively manifested in the provi-
sion that each party have an equal number of pleadings and an equal
amount of time for preparation.7 1
However, except for the requirement of equality of treatment, par-
ties appearing before a Chamber are able to adopt modified rules gov-
erning the written and oral proceedings. In addition to the general lan-
guage of Article 101, this ability is recognized in Article 31 of the
Rules, which specifically provides that: "[i]n every case submitted to
the Court, the President shall ascertain the views of the parties with
regard to questions of procedure. '72 Thus, parties before a Chamber
68. ROSENNE, supra note 17, at 73; see ROSENNE, supra note 52, at 544. Article
43 of the ICJ Statute provides:
1. The procedure shall consist of two parts: written and oral.
2. The written proceedings shall consist of the communication to the Court
and to the parties of memorials, counter-memorials and, if necessary, replies;
also all papers and documents in support.
3. These communications shall be made through the Registrar, in the order
and within the time fixed by the Court.
4. A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall be commu-
nicated to the other party.
5. The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses,
experts, agents, counsel, and advocates.
I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 43.
69. ROSENNE, supra note 17, at 73.
70. ROSENNE, supra note 52, at 546.
71. Id. at 547.
72. I.C.J. Rules, supra note 67, Art. 31. Article 31's relationship to modifying
written proceedings is found in Article 44 of the Rules. Article 44 states:
1. In the light of the information obtained . . . under Article 31 of these
Rules, the Court shall make the necessary orders to determine, inter alia, the
number and the order of filing of the pleadings and the time-limits within
which they must be filed.
2. In making an order under paragraph I of this Article, any agreement be-
tween the parties which does not cause unjustified delay shall be taken into
account.
3. The Court may, at the request of the party concerned, extend any time-
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enjoy a well recognized ability under Articles 101 and 31 of the ICJ
Rules to formulate the internal rules to govern the proceeding.
2. Iran - U.S. Tribunal
As has been the pattern in the two previous comparisons, parties
appearing before the Iran - U.S. Tribunal do not have the ability to
select, or even to modify, the internal rules to govern the proceeding. In
this regard, Article 111(2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration pro-
vides a pertinent clause: "the Tribunal shall conduct its business in ac-
cordance with the ... [UNCITRAL Rules] except to the extent modi-
fied by the parties or by the Tribunal .. ..*"' Based on the clear
language of the Claims Settlement Declaration, it would appear that
the parties have the ability to modify the rules. However, due to
changes made to the UNCITRAL Rules for use in the Iran - U.S.
Tribunal, this ability does not exist.
Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules provides for modification of
the rules by the parties.7 But Article 1(1) was amended for application
limit, or decide that any step taken after the expiration of the time-limit fixed
therefore shall be considered as valid, if it is satisfied that there is adequate
justification for the request. In either case the other party shall be given an
opportunity to state its views.
4 .... If the consultation referred to in Article 31 reveals persistent disagree-
ment between the parties as to the application ... of these Rules, the Court
shall be convened to decide the matter.
I.C.J. Rules, supra note 67, Art. 44.
Similarly, Article 31's relationship to modifying oral proceedings is found in Arti-
cle 58(2) of the Rules:
2. The order in which the parties will be heard, the method of handling the
evidence and of examining any witnesses and experts, and the number of
counsel and advocates to be heard on behalf of the each party, shall be settled
by the Court after the views of the parties have been ascertained in accor-
dance with Article 31 of these Rules.
I.C.J. Rules, supra note 67, Art. 58.
73. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
74. I.A.L.R. 6,308 (Apr. 1, 1983); Baker and Davis, supra note 42, at 85.
UNCITRAL Rules Article 1 states in full:
1. Where the parties to a contract have agreed in writing that disputes in
relation to that contract shall be referred to arbitration under the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, then such disputes shall be settled in accor-
dance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may agree
in writing.
2. These Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of these
Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration
from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail.
I.A.L.R. 6,308 (Apr. 1, 1983).
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by the Iran - U.S. Tribunal to only allow modifications to the arbitral
rules by the Full Tribunal or the two governments of Iran and the
United States.75 Consequently, parties appearing before the Iran - U.S.
Tribunal do not have the ability to select or modify the internal rules
governing the settlement of their dispute.
3. ICSID
As also has been the pattern, parties before an ICSID arbitration
have an almost totally unrestricted ability to select the internal rules to
govern their dispute. Article 44 of the ICSID Convention simply states
that: "Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted . . , except as
the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules
.. Thus, the parties are given the unequivocal opportunity to
formulate the procedural rules to govern the dispute through their own
agreement. The ICSID Arbitration Rules, however, are at the parties'
disposal should they so choose."
Even within the Arbitration Rules, the parties' ability to select
their own procedural rules is reinforced. Rule 20 states:
(1) As early as possible after the constitution of a Tribunal, its
President shall endeavor to ascertain the views of the parties
regarding questions of procedure. . . He shall, in particular,
seek their views on the following matters:
(a) the number of members of the Tribunal required to
constitute a quorum at its settings;
75. Baker & Davis, supra note 42, at 85. The modified Article 1(1) states:
Within the framework of the Algiers Declarations, the initiation and conduct
of proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be subject to the following
Tribunal Rules which may be modified by the Full Tribunal or the two
Governments.
I.A.L.R. 6,308-9 (Apr. 1, 1983).
76. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 45, Art. 44.
77. The procedural flexibility of ICSID arbitration was summarized by an ICSID
brochure as follows:
Details of the procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal are deter-
mined by rules of procedure supplementing the basic provisions of the Con-
vention. The Arbitration Rules will apply except to the extent that the parties
otherwise agree. Such agreement may be included in the instrument recording
the parties' consent to ICSID arbitration, or may be concluded subsequently,
either before or after the institution of proceedings. Any question of proce-
dure not covered by whatever rules are applicable will be decided by the
Tribunal.
Doc. I.C.S.I.D./12 at 11.
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(b) the language or languages to be used in the
proceeding;
(c) the number and sequence of the pleadings and the time
limits within which they are to be filed;
(d) the number of copies desired by each party of instru-
ments filed by the other;
(e) dispensing with the written or the oral procedure;
(f) the manner in which the cost of the proceedings is to
be apportioned; and
(g) the manner in which the record of the hearings shall
be kept.78
Thus, both the ICSID Convention and the Arbitration Rules them-
selves clearly establish that the parties before an ICSID-sponsored ar-
bitration are fully able to select or modify the procedural rules that will
be used to govern their dispute.
The above comparisons may only be found to conclude that in
terms of the parties' ability to choose the panel to hear the case, to
determine the applicable law to settle the dispute, and to select the
internal rules to govern the proceeding, the three forums span the full
spectrum from almost absolute liberty to complete subrogation of the
will of the parties. The most open forum, in which the parties are free
to agree upon all aspects of the arbitration, is the ICSID. At the oppo-
site extreme is the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, where the parties are voiceless
in all substantive matters concerning the settlement of their dispute.
Falling between the two but certainly leaning towards the ICSID, is
the least used of the three forums, the ICJ Chambers.
Parties before ICJ Chambers have the ability to choose their own
Chamber made up of existing ICJ judges pursuant to Article 26(2) and
to appoint ad hoc judges under the direction of Article 31(2) or 31(3).
The parties are also able to decide what law will govern their dispute
by agreeing upon "recognized rules" articulated in their special agree-
ment or, in the case of a written application, previous treaty or conven-
tion, which is then applied by the Chamber pursuant to Article
38(1)(a) of the Statute. And finally, parties appearing before ICJ
Chambers are able to select, through agreement with the Court, the
rules to govern their written and oral proceedings under Articles 101
and 31 of the ICJ Rules. In summary, a succinct description of the
three forums is this: the Iran - U.S. Tribunal is based on agreement of
78. I.C.S.I.D. Arbitration Rules, Rule 20 (1) reprinted in I.C.S.I.D. Basic Docu-
ments I.C.S.I.D./15 61, 73-74 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter I.C.S.I.D. Rules].
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the Tribunal, an ICJ Chamber is based on agreement of the parties
and the Chamber, and the ICSID is based on agreement of the parties.
Thus, if "arbitration is the product of agreement"' 9 is an appropri-
ate working definition of arbitration, then the ICJ Chambers, like the
ICSID, and even more so than the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, represent arbi-
tration for purposes of enforcing and executing its awards. A contrary
result would be nothing short of the "triumph of form over substance."
Hence an overview of the enforcement mechanisms used by the Iran -
U.S. Tribunal and the ICSID is a prerequisite to developing a specific
mechanism for enforcing ICJ Chamber awards.
IV. ENFORCEMENT & EXECUTION
A. The Iran - U.S. Tribunal And The New York Convention
Awards of the Iran - U.S. Tribunal are enforced and executed in
two ways. The first way involves the escrow account established in the
Algiers Accords to provide funding for awards issued against Iran.8"
The second way, however, is not an internal mechanism of the Algiers
Accords, but involves the use of domestic courts in enforcing and exe-
cuting awards against the United States and United States nationals.
Although Article IV(3) of the Claims Settlement Declaration directs
that "[a]ny award which the Tribunal may render against either gov-
ernment shall be enforced against such government in the courts of any
nation in accordance with its laws," 81 the actual external mechanism
used is the New York Convention."2
Article III of the New York Convention directs the Contracting
States to "recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with [their own] rules of procedure."8 As a prerequisite to
enforcement, however, Article 11(1) requires "an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration."' "
79. Baker & Davis, supra note 42, at 90.
80. See supra note 40.
81. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 40, Art. IV.
82. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done at New York on June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; see generally Leonard V. Quigley,
Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L. J. 1049 (1961) (Providing a
general background of the development of the New York Convention, its mechanics,
and accession by the United States.).
83. New York Convention, supra note 82, Art. III, cited in Ministry of Defense v.
Gould, Inc., 887 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1989).
84. New York Convention, supra note 82, Art. 11 (1).
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The applicability of the New York Convention to the Iran - U.S.
Tribunal was validated in Ministry of Defense v. Gould, Inc.8 5 In
Gould, the issue presented to the Ninth Circuit was "whether an award
against an American corporation entered by the Iran - United States
Claims Tribunal [could] be enforced in federal court" with subject
matter jurisdiction vesting under the New York Convention. 6 In up-
holding the District Court's affirmative ruling, the Court of Appeals
made two holdings highly relevant to enforcing ICJ Chamber awards
under the New York Convention. First, the court held that the Conven-
tion's requirement of an "agreement in writing" was satisfied by the
Algiers Accords between the two governments,87 with the individual,
Gould, Inc., ratifying its authority by filing a claim and arbitrating
before the Tribunal.18 Thus, if an international agreement between two
nations that prohibits a third party, their nationals, from using any
other forum for settling disputes satisfies the "agreement in writing"
requirement of Article II(1) of the New York Convention as to that
third party, then certainly a special agreement between two nations to
bring a case before an ICJ Chamber would also be satisfactory.8
9
The second holding by the court was that "an award need not be
made 'under a national law' for a court to entertain jurisdiction over its
enforcement pursuant to the Convention."9 " In other words, for an
award to be enforceable under the New York Convention, it does not
have to be subject to review by a domestic court. This is of particular
importance to the prospect of enforcing ICJ Chamber awards under
the New York Convention because of Articles 27 and 60 of the ICJ
Statute.
Article 27 states that "[a] judgment given by any of the chambers
... shall be considered as rendered by the Court." 91 Any decisions of
an ICJ Chamber must therefore meet the requirements of a judgment
of the full Court. Specifically, Article 60 directs that: "The judgment is
final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or
scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of
85. 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989).
86. Id. at 1358. The New York Convention is codified at 9 U.S.C.A. §§201-208
(West Supp. 1991).
87. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1363.
88. Id. at 1364 citing Lewis, supra note 40, at 546.
89. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Prospects for Enforcing Monetary Judgments
of the International Court of Justice: A Study of Nicaragua's Judgment Against the
United States, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 891, 919 (1990). A written application pursuant to
Article 40 of the ICJ Statute would also seem to qualify. See infra pages 75-76.
90. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1365.
91. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 27.
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any party."92 Thus, because an ICJ judgment is "final and without ap-
peal," it is intrinsic that the judgment is "non-national" - i.e., without
appeal to a domestic court.9" The Gould holding that "an award need
not be made 'under a national law'" to be enforced under the New
York Convention is therefore of immense importance to enforcing an
ICJ Chamber award under the Convention.94 Hence, because an ICJ
Chamber is more characteristic of international arbitration - through
the parties' ability to determine the panel, the applicable law, and the
rules of procedure - than is the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, and because it
satisfies the requisites of the New York Convention as outlined in the
Gould case, there appears to be no sound reason for prohibiting ICJ
Chamber awards from being enforced under the New York
Convention.
B. Enforcing ICSID
In contrast to practice under the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, awards is-
sued by ICSID arbitrations are not enforced under the New York Con-
vention, but through the ICSID Convention itself as implemented by
domestic legislation in the Contracting States. Article 54(1) of the
ICSID Convention requires that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pur-
suant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it
were a final judgment of a court in that State.95
The legislation implementing Article 54(1) in the United States is
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a) (1988). When presented to the Senate
92. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 60.
93. A great deal has been written on "non-national" or "a-national" awards. For
a more detailed discussion see Lewis, supra note 40, at 550; Caron, supra note 40, at
116-126; Hanessian, supra note 51, at 344; Lake & Dana, supra note 40, at 755, 796-
800; Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1989); Van den Berg, Some
Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement under the New York and ICSID Con-
ventions, 2 I.C.S.I.D. Rev. 439, 442 (1987).
94. Also of importance to enforcing an ICJ Chamber award in the United States,
which reserved in its acceptance to the New York Convention the reciprocal right of
only enforcing awards rendered in states party to the Convention, is the Gould court's
recognition that the Iran - U.S. Tribunal "sits at the Hague ... in the Netherlands,
which is a contracting State." Gould, 887 F.2d at 1362. Because the ICJ also sits at
the Hague, the court's statement is of obvious importance to enforcing ICJ Chamber
awards under the New York Convention in United States courts.
95. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 45, Art. 54.
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Foreign Relations Committee, the purpose of the implementing legisla-
tion was explained as follows:
[T]he convention provides that arbitral awards rendered pursu-
ant to the convention shall be enforceable in contracting states.
Actually, it is only the pecuniary obligations imposed by an ar-
bitral award; that is, any monetary damages assessed against
one of the parties, which the courts of a contracting state is
obligated to enforce....
The main purpose of [the bill] is to implement article 54(1) of
the convention . . . [by stating that] an arbitral award shall be
enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if
the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdic-
tion of one of the several States. . . .Essentially, this means
that the district courts would be precluded from inquiring into
the merits of the underlying controversy.96
Thus, by precluding the courts "from inquiring into the merits of the
underlying controversy," ICSID arbitrations, like the ICJ Chambers,
are also "non-national." 9 But because the ICSID Convention is specifi-
cally tailored to enforcing ICSID awards, it could not be used to en-
force Chamber awards. The ICSID Convention, as well as the New
York Convention, could, however, serve as a model for a similar con-
vention for enforcing Chamber awards.
C. The Problem Of Sovereign Immunity
A problem often facing a party holding an ICSID award, possibly
an Iran - U.S. Tribunal award, and definitely an ICJ Chamber award,
96. S. REP. No. 1374, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2617, 2618-19 (statement of Fred B. Smith, General Counsel, Department of the
Treasury).
97. That ICSID arbitrations are "non-national" is stated in Article 53(1):
The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any
appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.
Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to
the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant
provisions of this Convention.
I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 45, Article 53.
For an exhaustive look at the ICSID internal control mechanism run amuck see
W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitra-
tion, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739.
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is sovereign immunity. This problem is actually two-pronged: enforcing
the award and executing the award.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is invoked by a foreign state to
exempt itself from the jurisdiction of another state's domestic courts.98
In the United States, this doctrine is subject to the restrictions of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")." The FSIA provides
uniform standards to be employed by courts when determining whether
a foreign state is immune from suit.100 Section 1605(a)(1)(6) of the
FSIA provides that immunity from jurisdiction is not available to a
foreign state in any case:
in which the action is brought . . . to confirm an award made
pursuant to ... an agreement to arbitrate, if . . . (B) the agree-
ment or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other inter-
national agreement in force for the United States calling for
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards . .. . 0
Thus, because both the New York and ICSID Conventions are treaties
"in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards," states are precluded from seeking sovereign
immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts in cases brought
under these conventions to enforce awards against them.
As for executing an arbitral award, the relevant law in the United
States is 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a), the commercial activity exception to the
FSIA.'02 Section 1610(a)(6) declares that "property in the United
States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity" is not
immune from attachment or execution if:
the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award
98. Note, ICSID Arbitral Awards in the United States, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 101, 107 (1988) [hereinafter Note, ICSID Arbitral Awards].
99. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
100. Note, ICSID Arbitral Awards, supra note 98, at 108.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988); Note, ICSID Arbitration Awards, supra
note 98, at 109; Note, International Commercial Arbitration as a Model for Resolving
Treaty Disputes, 21 INT'L L. & POL. 379, 394 (1989) [hereinafter Note, International
Commercial Arbitration].
102. "Commercial activity" is defined in the FSIA as:
either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be deter-
mined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular trans-
action or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
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rendered against the foreign state, provided that attachment in
aid of execution, or execution, would not be inconsistent with
any provision in the arbitral agreement. 103
Thus, section 1610(a) explicitly disallows sovereign immunity from ex-
ecution of an arbitral award upon property used for a commercial ac-
tivity. It must be noted, however, that finding property fitting within
the "commercial activity" definition may remain problematic. 10
The FSIA greatly alleviates the problems caused by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in enforcing and executing an award against a
state in a United States court. Worldwide,* however, the likelihood of
enforcing and executing an award issued against a state still requires
cognizance of the scope and application of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the domestic courts. As in the United States, some domes-
tic courts will only execute an award upon those assets of a state that
fit within the commercial activity exception. 10 5 Award holders are,
however, theoretically able to "forum shop" for the domestic court sys-
tem with the least restrictive view of sovereign immunity among the
nations where assets of the debtor defendant are located.10 6
In addition, an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity is also a pos-
sibility. Often banks lending to states will require the adoption of a
clause expressly waiving immunity from execution.107 A concise version-
provides that: "The Borrower waives any immunity from which it could
claim as a sovereign in the courts in which execution of the ... award
would be brought." 1 Thus, with planning and the proper drafting of
an international agreement, it is possible to minimize the problems
presented by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
D. Three Preliminary Matters
Having reviewed the enforcement mechanisms of the Iran - U.S.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) (1988).
104. For an example of property remaining outside the definition of "commercial
activity" see Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, 650
F. Supp. 73, 77-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
105. The United Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands are among other na-
tions that join the United States in adhering "to the restrictive view of sovereign immu-
nity." Soley, supra note 45, at 542.
106. Georges R. Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration,
38 ARB. J. 34, 46-48 (June 1983); Soley, supra note 45, at 528, 542.
107. Soley, supra note 45, at 542 (quoting Delaume, The ICSID and the Banker,
INT'L FIN. L. REV. 9, 12 (Oct. 1983)).
108. Id.
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Tribunal and the ICSID, conclusions may be drawn as to the appropri-
ateness and applicability of a mechanism for enforcing awards ren-
dered by ICJ Chambers. But first, three preliminary matters must be
addressed. The first involves distinguishing the types of inter-State dis-
putes suitable for resolution by a Chamber. The key to this distinction
is recognizing the sometimes inevitable triumph of politics over
adjudication.
1. Appropriate Disputes
In the realm of international relations, in order for a dispute to be
capable of being settled by a binding decision of a third party like an
ICJ Chamber, the disputants must generally have and desire to main-
tain a relationship of sufficient mutual benefit that anticipates continu-
ing commercial and political intercourse between the two nations. In
short, both parties must be able to justify the need for an amicable
settlement of the dispute even though it may not fully reflect what they
perceive as the just outcome. These disputes are exemplified by deci-
sions to bring the cases before an ICJ Chamber through either a spe-
cial agreement or a written application pursuant to Article 40 of the
ICJ Statute. Of the two, a special agreement reflects the higher level of
diplomatic interface by manifesting the parties' ability to agree on the
issue to be decided, who is to decide it, and the law and rules by which
it will be decided. A written application, however, reflects a somewhat
lower level of diplomatic interface by manifesting a conciliation by the
parties that the issue be permanently resolved. After such a concilia-
tion, however, the parties are able to agree on submitting themselves to
the jurisdiction of an ICJ Chamber for settling the dispute. The normal
situation involves one party beginning the process by sending a written
application to bring the case before a Chamber, and the other party
then recognizing the benefits of resolving the matter and thus agreeing
to the application.
Hence, the proper disputes to be brought before ICJ Chambers are
those in which the parties are able to agree on the appropriateness of a
formalized and binding settlement retained through the decision of a
third party.1"9 In contrast, those issues of such perceived national inter-
est as to evoke visceral reactions - i.e., those flash points of world
politics that defy any ability or will for third party settlement - are
not within the proper domain of ICJ Chambers. These are disputes
which reflect the triumph of politics, or its extension through force,
109. This idea preempts the bringing of cases under compulsory jurisdiction in
ICJ Chambers.
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over adjudication. By their very nature, disputes involving armed con-
flict fit well within this category. Others may include issues concerning
natural resources - oil issues in Mexico, for example. In reality,
whether or not a dispute is appropriate for settlement by an ICJ Cham-
ber will be determined by the reaction evoked in the parties by each
particular case.
2. Monetary Awards Only
A second consideration of enforcing ICJ Chamber awards in do-
mestic courts is that they be limited to pecuniary obligations. For ex-
ample, Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention requires the Contracting
States to "enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by [the] award
.... "110 Such a limitation reflects a recognition of the realistic capa-
bilities of a mechanism to enforce and execute Chamber awards. Be-
yond attaching assets of the debtor State, there is little else that can be
expected of a domestic court. In a hypothetical situation, if State One
refuses to comply with a decision of an ICJ Chamber that it recognize
its boundary with State Two to be behind a contested mountain range,
a domestic court would be virtually powerless in enforcing the order.
This type of situation is more appropriately within the jurisdiction of
the United Nations Security Council than within the jurisdiction of a
domestic court. A court would, however, be able to enforce and execute
upon the same Chamber decision, subject to the limitations imposed by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, if the decision required State One
to move its boundary to a point behind the contested mountain range or
pay State Two Five-Hundred Million Dollars. Here, State Two could
seek enforcement of its award through the normal channels provided in
110. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 45, Article 54. Related to the idea of lim-
iting enforcement of Chamber awards to pecuniary obligations is the United States and
France, among others, restricting the applicability of the New York Convention to
awards arising only from "commercial cases." O'Connell, supra note 89, at 919. Al-
though this reservation is likely to exclude some possible Chamber decisions from en-
forcement, there would certainly be others that would qualify. An example would be a
dispute arising under a FCN Treaty as in the ELSI case. Id. See also Werner F.
Ebeke & Mary E. Parker, Foreign Country Money-Judgments and Arbitral Awards
and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States: A
Conventional Approach, 24 INT'L LAW. 21, 48-49 (1990) ("Generally, the FCN treaty
provisions are consistent with the New York Convention.").
The United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are among na-
tions that do not have a "commercial case" reservation. O'Connell, supra note 89, at
919. But the possibility of some ICJ Chamber decisions being excluded from enforce-
ment in those states with a "commercial case" reservation may point to the need of
establishing a new convention for enforcing Chamber awards.
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the appropriate domestic court.
3. Advantages Of Using Chambers
Beyond the advantages enjoyed by the parties to an ICJ Chamber
stemming from their ability to determine the composition, law and
rules of the Chamber, there are other advantages to be considered. One
is the possibility of a Chamber being convened outside The Hague for
the convenience of the parties.111 Article 28 of the ICJ Statute allows
that "[t]he chambers ... may, with the consent of the parties, sit and
exercise their functions elsewhere than at The Hague."' 12 Thus, should
the parties consider it useful, the Chambers could be convened in a
location closer to the dispute, or in any location generally more
convenient.
The implication of this possibility is not fully appreciated unless
considered in conjunction with Article 31(3) of the ICJ Statute. Article
31(3) provides that if the full Court does not include a national of ei-
ther party, then both parties may appoint an ad hoc judge to the
Chamber.' This ability could be of particular benefit to the develop-
ing world. Considering the vast number of developing countries, and
that the composition of the ICJ islimited to fifteen judges representing
"the main forms of civilization and . . . principal legal systems of the
world,"' 4 the probability is high that neither of the two developing
countries seeking to bring a case before a Chamber would be repre-
sented by a national on the Court. Thus, both nations would have the
opportunity to select an ad hoc judge to sit on the Chamber."'
A final advantage of using an ICJ Chamber is its subsidized cost.
Because the ICJ is the judicial arm of the United Nations, "the ex-
111. Hyde, supra note 3, at 441. ICJ Judge Stephen Schwebel describes the Hyde
article as: "What may have been the first small sound of life [for ad hoc Chambers] is
to be found in 1968 in an innovative Note published by James Nevin Hyde." Schwebel,
supra note 1, at 835.
1 12. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 28. An interesting question that must be
mentioned is whether an ICJ Chamber award rendered outside The Hague and in a
state not a party to the New York Convention would be enforceable in the United
States, which reserved the right of only enforcing awards rendered in a Contracting
State. See supra note 9. The apparent and probable answer is no, that it would not be
enforceable in a United States domestic court.
113. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 31.
114. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Arts. 3 and 9.
S115. It must be remembered that even if only one party is not represented by a
national on the Court, that party is still able to select an ad hoc judge under Article
31(2). I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 31.
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penses of the Court [are] borne by the United Nations."'116 And al-
though cost cutting is important to all nations, the subsidized cost of an
ICJ Chamber is again an advantage of particular interest to developing
countries. Thus, the ability to change the Chamber's location for a par-
ticular case, the propensity of many disputants being able to appoint ad
hoc judges, and the subsidized costs of the forum present three addi-
tional advantages for utilizing ICJ Chambers to settle inter-State
disputes.
E. Enforcing Chamber Awards
With these preliminary matters addressed, we now turn to the cen-
tral question of what type of mechanism would be of greatest benefit
and utility for enforcing Chamber awards. Having shown that an ICJ
Chamber possesses a much closer resemblance to international arbitra-
tion than does the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, there is little reason for deny-
ing that Chamber awards, like those of the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, are
eligible for enforcement under the New York Convention.1 17 The alter-
116. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, Art. 33. Article 33 states in full that: "The
expenses of the Court shall be borne by the United Nations in such a manner as shall
be decided by the General Assembly." See also Hyde, supra note 3, at 441; Brauer,
supra note 27, at 475 ("In particular, the salaries of judges and secretaries, as well as
clerical costs, are paid out of the U.N. budget.").
117. An obstacle to enforcing Chamber awards under the New York Convention
is the formalistic point that the ICJ, and therefore its Chambers, is generally viewed as
a court, not an arbitral panel. Inaleed, the very name, International Court of Justice,
seems to dictate that a Chamber award would not be enforceable under a convention
specifically entitled "The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards." Interview with Barry E. Carter, Professor of Law, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center (April 22, 1991). This article, however, attempts to demonstrate
that such a consistency to form is inappropriate in light of the substantive workings of
the Chambers, especially in comparison to the Iran - U.S. Tribunal. Beyond this rea-
soning, however, only two comments remain.
First, the New York Convention does not define arbitration. The Random House
College Dictionary (Revised Edition, 1984), however, defines arbitration as "the hear-
ing and determining of a dispute between parties by a person or persons chosen or
agreed to by them." By this definition, an ICJ Chamber, because of the parties' ability
to choose through Articles 26 and 31 the judges to hear their dispute, is a better exam-
ple of arbitration than the Iran - U.S. Tribunal. Second, although Article II(1) of the
Claims Settlement Declaration mandates establishing "an International Arbitral Tri-
bunal," the official title is the Iran - United States Claims Tribunal. I.A.L.R. 2,364
(Feb. 6, 1981). Turning again to the Random House College Dictionary, tribunal is
defined as "a court of justice." Thus, with these definitions in mind, the fact that an
ICJ Chamber more greatly resembles arbitration in substance than in form may not
present an insurmountable problem for enforcing Chamber awards under the New
York Convention. It does, however, present extra evidence for establishing a new con-
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native would be to create a new convention to mandate the enforcement
of Chamber awards.'
The biggest advantage of using the New York Convention is its
immediate availability. An ICJ Chamber could issue a monetary award
arising from a commercial dispute," 9 and as soon as it became evident
that Nation A refused to abide by the award, Nation B could bring an
action in the domestic court of any Contracting State to the New York
Convention. Assuming the existence of assets of Nation A in the Con-
tracting State and that claims of sovereign immunity would not apply
for executing the award, the judgment could be satisfied.
As discussed above, the Gould decision concluded that awards en-
tered by the Iran - U.S. Tribunal were enforceable under the New
York Convention by holding that the Algiers Accords satisfied the
"agreement in writing" requirement of Article 11,1 10 and that the Con-
vention did not prohibit enforcing "non-national" awards. 2' By com-
paring the Iran - U.S. Tribunal with the ICJ Chambers in conjunction
with Gould, it is apparent that enforcing Chamber awards under the
New York Convention is the next logical step - especially in light of
the abundance of characteristics shared by the ICJ Chambers and
traditional notions of international arbitration. For these reasons, using
the New York Convention for enforcing Chamber awards could be-
come widely recognized.
In fact, enforcement of ICJ Chamber awards may be becoming an
vention for enforcing Chamber awards.
118. Either the New York Convention or the ICSID Convention could serve as
useful models for creating a new convention for enforcing Chamber awards. The idea
of using the ICSID Convention as a model for enforcing the ICJ has been gathering
dust since at least 1971 when it was proposed by W. Michael Reisman. See W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF IN-
TERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 672-73 (1971). Reisman proposed that:
Article 54 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes is an
appropriate model for rendering judgments of the International Court en-
forceable eo ipso in municipal courts .... The measure could be further facil-
itated by appropriate internal implementing legislation by each contracting
state.
Id.; see supra note 95 and accompanying text for Article 54. Perhaps now is an appro-
priate time to dust off Reisman's idea and put it to use.
119. A "commercial dispute" is provided as the example in order to avoid
problems connected with the "commercial case" reservation found in some states. See
supra note 110. A hypothetical commercial dispute before an ICJ Chamber could in-
volve Nation A arbitrarily denying Nation B's national airline landing rights and thus
violating a treaty between them.
120. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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international norm. In a 1988 Court of Appeals case holding that pri-
vate parties do not have a cause of action to enforce ICJ decisions in
U.S. courts,122 Judge Mikva stated in dicta that:
[i]n special agreement cases - in which both parties to a dis-
pute simultaneously submit to the ICJ's jurisdiction - adher-
ence to the Court's judgment may well be the norm . . . ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States
... from which no derogation is permitted.
1 23
Thus, if adherence to special agreement cases has become an interna-
tional norm, then enforcement of Chamber cases brought by special
agreement may also have become an international norm and thus read-
ily, if not obligatorily, enforceable under the New York Convention.1 24
But, in spite of Judge Mikva's comment, the problem remains that
courts in some of the Contracting States may resist making the leap to
enforcing Chamber awards under the New York Convention. 125 For
this reason, a better mechanism for enforcing Chamber awards may be
found in drafting and ratifying a new convention. A Convention on the
Enforcement and Execution of Chamber Awards could be created
under U.N. auspices requiring the Signatory Nations to enforce and
execute the pecuniary obligations of ICJ Chamber awards. The conven-
tion could be limited to cases involving special agreements or written
applications, thus assuring that no cases be brought before a Chamber
not based on mutual consent, and removing any danger of the conven-
tion being used to perpetuate harassing, politically motivated suits or
disguised expropriations. Similarly, if the proposed new convention
were to adopt a uniform sovereign immunity law, the problems facing
an award-holder trying to execute on the assets of a nation would be
122. Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1988). The court reasoned that ICJ decisions "operate between and among govern-
ments and are not enforceable by individuals having no relation to the claim that the
I.C.J. has adjudicated . . . ." Id. at 934.
123. Id. at 941, citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679.
124. Three of the four Chamber cases were brought by special agreement. They
include: Gulf of Main Order, supra note 18, at 3; Frontier Dispute Order, supra note
22, at 6; and Land, Island and Maritime Order, supra note 22, at 10.
125. Indeed, the courts of some Contracting States may be uneasy with applying
the New York Convention to the Iran - U.S. Tribunal. One can only wonder as to what
would have been the outcome of Gould had the U.S. Government not filed a "State-
ment of Interest" urging Iranian access to the courts for enforcing its award. Gould,
887 F.2d at 1361 n.7.
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greatly eased.1"' However, if such a uniform law remains elusive, it
should not preclude the drafting of a new convention. Based on the
numerous benefits enjoyed by parties using the ICJ Chambers - that
is, the ability to choose the judges, law and rules determining the dis-
pute, along with the location of the Chamber and its subsidized costs
- signing and ratifying a new convention could quickly become popu-
lar within the international community.
What then is the optimum mechanism for enforcing ICJ Chamber
awards - the New York Convention or a new convention? The answer
almost appears to be both. Based on the major characteristics of classi-
cal international arbitration found in ICJ Chambers, especially in light
of the Gould case and the lack of characteristics of classical interna-
tional arbitration found in the Iran - U.S. Tribunal, there is every rea-
son for utilizing the New York Convention to enforce and execute
monetary awards rendered by ICJ Chambers. Indeed, given the com-
ment of Judge Mikva, such a course may even be mandatory. However,
there remains the possibility that some domestic courts will not recog-
nize the wisdom of applying the New York Convention to awards of
the ICJ Chambers. Thus, a new convention is needed to remove all
doubt as to the role of domestic courts in enforcing and executing pecu-
niary obligations of Chamber awards. States should continue to bring
cases before ICJ Chambers, reassured by the strong possibility that
should it be necessary to enforce the award, the New York Convention
can apply. At the same time, however, the United Nations should focus
on creating a new convention specifically mandating the enforcement of
Chamber awards as a dictate of international law.
V. CONCLUSION
A comparison of the ICJ Chambers, the Iran - U.S. Tribunal and
the ICSID leads to the conclusion that the ICJ Chambers possesses
many more characteristics of traditional international arbitration than
does the Iran - U.S. Tribunal. Parties settling their dispute through the
ICSID enjoy the greatest liberty in choosing the panel to hear their
case, and in determining the applicable law and internal rules for
resolving the matter. After the ICSID, parties before an ICJ Chamber
are allowed to agree among themselves and the Court, whose approval
126. See generally L. Weatherly Lowe, Note, The International Law Commis-
sion's Draft Articles of the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property:
The Commercial Contract Exception, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 657 (1989) (dis-
cussing the U.N. International Law Commission's articles as attempting to conclude an
international convention on sovereign immunity laws and codify the spectrum of views.)
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has been readily forthcoming, on the appropriate judges, law and rules.
Parties before the Iran - U.S. Tribunal are provided the least opportu-
nity to influence their forum, being tightly confined by the Claims Set-
tlement Declaration.
Through application of the Gould reasoning for enforcing the Iran
- U.S. Tribunal under the New York Convention, it is apparent that
the New York Convention is an equally appropriate mechanism for en-
forcing monetary awards of the ICJ Chambers. Indeed, if the dicta in
Judge Mikva's opinion is true, i.e., that enforcing ICJ awards arising
from special agreements has become an international norm, then en-
forcement of Chamber awards may be mandatory under international
law.
Nonetheless, though the logic of enforcing Chamber awards
through the New York Convention seems compelling, application of the
New York Convention might be thwarted by unconvinced domestic
courts. Thus, a new convention for enforcing and executing Chamber
monetary awards is necessary. Such a new convention would be helpful
in specifically outlining the role and responsibilities of the domestic
courts. The scope of the sovereign immunity doctrine could also be
addressed.
Thus, states should not hesitate to utilize the advantages of the
ICJ Chambers because of the strong possibility that if judicial enforce-
ment is necessary, the New York Convention can be found to apply.
But the United Nations General Assembly should also begin drafting a
new convention for enforcing Chamber awards. Such a step would fur-
ther the aims of the 1972 and 1978 changes to the ICJ Rules by en-
couraging and facilitating the use of this potentially significant interna-
tional forum.
